A
nationalised or integrated railway has positive externalities in terms of
geographical mobility, though these have only recently become apparent. In the
1980s, consumers were still discovering the car, which became a more flexible
and personal substitute, especially as the expansion of finance allowed more
people to own them, and as more businesses grew up in out of town areas with
parking. Government expansion of the road network, along with the decline of
the coal industry (which trains had transported and which allowed for cheap
freight because trains drew on coal-fired electrical grids) undermined rail.
The
privatisation illustrates the difficulty of showing that a market can exist.
The railway itself is in most cases a necessary monopoly, bordering on the
natural. This compares to the Post Office. If the system does not reach
everywhere, and integrate ticketing and stations as it does, it will just
become a regional niche (letters would be concentrated between urban areas and
would not reach the highlands or Cornwall, trains would only run on commuter
routes, stamps and tickets would be too expensive and complicated etc.) So the
Major government with trains, like the Cameron government with the Royal Mail,
privatised parts differently. Railtrack went to one private company; freight
and passenger franchises were awarded to other companies; and (disastrously)
maintenance was outsourced.
This
created a pressure to get rid of experienced staff to cut costs, and to price
discriminate. It also left the shareholders of the new companies making money,
but the industry still requiring subsidy, which was a serious principal-agent
problem and reputationally destructive. After a series of accidents and public
anger, Railtrack collapsed and was replaced by the non-profit Network Rail.
After the covid crisis, when working from home undermined the commuter model,
franchises became uneconomic, and in 2022, Greater British Railways began to
reintegrate the railways, though some franchises remain. This has led to the
railways becoming a monopsony again, and to the inevitable fears of a summer
strike as workers act rationally to make the monopsony raise wages and protect
their conditions.
The
railways have also created such a degree of price discrimination that the
public would prefer (on every survey) a much simpler service. Price
discrimination reallocates consumer surplus to profit by offering different
prices to different consumers, or by changing the pricing of the service to
take advantage of different elasticities of demand at peak and off-peak times,
or by charging wholesale or season prices differently. The discriminating body
must ensure no transfer between customers is possible (and tie tickets
therefore to photographs, ID, or personal names and credit cards or email
accounts.) This allows for revenue to act as a return on investment, and for
cross-subsidy, but is deeply complicated in a fragmented railway system.
Government
since 2010 has also returned to cutting investment in real terms, but this has
been balanced by very substantial investment in new trains by the franchises.
Since this investment is over, and the new trains are running, there is no need
for government to continue to support the franchises with subsidies, and
inflation is eating at their revenue anyway. The rational thing to do,
therefore, is to allow the railway franchises to collapse or negotiate deals to
transfer the new equipment to a government body at low or no cost.
There
is also a need for strategic planning in the railway industry. With
petrol-driven cars and buses in long term decline, and new technology
expensive, recreating a regional and inter-town network of trains for short
journeys is one option. Creating very fast prestige trains which nevertheless
take pressure off the existing network and redistribute passengers is another.
Before covid, the latter strategy was viable, but in 2022 the network is still
only carrying around 15-20% of the passengers it had at peak commuting times in
2019. Shareholders in the current financial environment will not pay for the
short journey expansion, and yet such infrastructure development would relieve
some carbon and congestion costs and calm housing bubbles by spreading jobs and
settlement, as well as improving mobility in a tight labour market. Only
government can expand the system now, although the investment required might
add to national debt. Increased tax revenue and productivity gains might
justify the expenditure.
This
leads to the question of nationalisation. There are different models of
partnership, but a straightforward integration of the maintenance, track, and
stations, accompanied with a clear policy towards car parking and ticketing,
could allow for great gains. The gradual absorption of the franchises for
passengers, and the integration of the profitable freight sector would allow
for others. The problem which arises is the relationship of the new body to
unions, the front-loading of integration costs at a time of high national debt,
and the decline of commuting and the housing market which is ongoing or
imminent. When these factors are considered alongside the gains from an
integrated railway, in terms of environmental benefits and power usage, then
nationalisation, perhaps with an element of private investment, becomes the
most rational course.
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